Publications and Works in Progress

"Gaining and Losing Land: The Micro-Mechanisms of Electoral Stability and Conflict in Kenya" (Forthcoming, Journal of Peace Research)

How does large-scale land reform affect electoral stability? While scholars have theorized elite-level logics of land distribution, few studies analyze the effects of these reforms on the attitudes and behaviors of ordinary citizens. Using a quasi-experimental survey in Kenya’s Coast region, this paper aims to test the effects of the Kenyan Government’s recent land titling campaign: the most ambitious and extensive since the country’s independence. Specifically, it evaluates a set of hypotheses about how gaining or losing land prior to an election affects an individual’s political preferences, trust in political institutions, and perceived election-time threat. Beyond increasing incumbent support, results indicate that title deed beneficiaries are more likely to trust state and electoral institutions than non-beneficiaries and those who have lost land rights. Yet while title deed recipients have more trust in state institutions, they are nonetheless more likely to perceive threat around elections compared to non-beneficiaries. Broadly, the paper presents a set of potential mechanisms through which land titling and distribution can shape how people participate in the electoral process. This can have significant implications for understanding the dynamics of stability and violence surrounding elections.

 

Can Politicians Exploit Ethnic Grievances? An Experimental Study of Land Appeals in Kenya,” with Jeremy Horowitz.  Political Behavior. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9485-1

 

Numerous accounts from conflict-prone settings claim that political leaders can increase electoral support by appealing to perceived ethnic grievances, and that such appeals sharpen inter-group antagonisms that can contribute to violence. Yet little empirical research demonstrates how appeals to group-based grievances actually work and the types of voters most likely to respond to such appeals. We explore the political effects of ethnic grievances appeals, focusing on whether political candidates benefit from their use. We conduct a survey experiment in Kenya’s Rift Valley, where conflict over land and electoral violence are closely linked. We find that grievance appeals have surprisingly little effect for most voters. Instead, only a narrow segment of each ethnic community—those who are relatively poor or land insecure—reward politicians for the use of divisive appeals. Further, we show that for some, exposure to prior violence conditions how individuals respond to the appeals, decreasing support for candidates who employ divisive rhetoric. These results suggest that voters in conflict-prone settings may be less easily swayed by the ethnic appeals of elites than much of the literature presumes.

 
“Land Grievances and the Mobilization of Electoral Violence: Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya,” Journal of Peace Research. 2015. 52(2): 622-635, with Matthew Mitchell. 

Recent studies have asked why elites resort to violence, yet many overlook the process and dynamics of mobilizing violence. How do politicians convince their supporters to fight? This article argues that in multi-ethnic and democratizing societies where land and property rights are weak and politicized, land grievances can provide leaders with a powerful tool to organize electoral violence. We develop a theory to show how land grievances can give rise to violent mobilization when leaders frame elections as a threat to the land security of supporters or an opportunity to reclaim land or strengthen land rights. Conversely, land grievances are ineffective when citizens do not believe that elections signal a credible threat to their land security or an opportunity to strengthen land rights. We further specify how the type of land grievance shapes the logic and form of violent action. Grievances based on land insecurity shape a pre- emptive logic of violence, while grievances based on competing land claims often shape an opportunistic logic of electoral violence. The article examines the validity of our theory using a comparative case study between zones of escalation and non-escalation of violence during post-electoral crises in Kenya (2007–08) and Coˆte d’Ivoire (2010–11). By observing the variation between positive and negative cases, the article identifies factors that foment and constrain the mobilization of election violence.

Contentious Land Narratives and the Non-escalation of Violence: Evidence from Kenya’s Coast Region.” African Studies Review.  https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2017.2 (Winner of the ASA Graduate Student Paper Prize).

 

This article examines the puzzle of the non-escalation of electoral violence. Drawing on evidence from Kenya’s Coast and Rift Valley regions, the article argues that land narratives along the Coast create few motives for people to participate in electoral violence because residents do not link their land rights with electoral outcomes. Politicians thus have far less power to use land narratives to organize violence. Two factors help account for this regional variation between the Rift Valley and the Coast: the strength of the political patron and the size of “outsiders” relative to “insiders.”

Defending the City, Defending Votes: Campaign Strategies in Urban Ghana.Journal of Modern African Studies, 55(4): 681-708, with Jeffrey Paller. 

Rapid urbanisation in African democracies is changing the way that political parties engage with their constituents, shifting relations between hosts and migrants. This article examines the strategies that parties use to maintain and build electoral support in increasingly diverse contexts. Drawing on in-depth interviews and ethnographic research in Accra, Ghana, we find that some urban political parties rely on inclusive forms of mobilisation, promoting images of cosmopolitanism and unity to incorporate a broad grassroots coalition. Yet in nearby constituencies, parties respond to changing demographics through exclusive forms of mobilisation, using narratives of indigeneity and coercion to intimidate voters who ‘do not belong’. Two factors help explain this variation in mobilisation: incumbency advantage and indigene dominance. In contrast to most scholarship on ethnicity and electoral politics in Africa, we find that these varying mobilisation strategies emerge from very local neighbourhood-level logics and motivations.

“‘If You are Bitten by a Snake, you will Fear a Piece of Rope:’ Individual-Level Effects of Electoral Violence in Kenya” (Under review)

 

What are the enduring effects of exposure to election violence? Some studies suggest that exposure to political violence hardens ethnic and political identities and erodes trust and cooperation. Others argue that the exposure to violence increases political participation and empathy toward strangers. This manuscript builds on this debate, examining individual-level effects of exposure to election violence. Specifically, it asks how the experience of election violence shapes one’s openness toward ethnic outgroups, trust in political leadership, and inter-ethnic engagement. Drawing on an individual-level survey conducted five years after Kenya’s 2007-08 post-election violence, the manuscript finds that individuals who experienced election violence are less open to ethnic outsiders and less trusting of political authority. Yet contrary to existing expectations, it also finds that exposure to election violence increases one’s likelihood of participating in inter-ethnic forms of community engagement. Broadly, the article contributes to research on political violence by specifying the micro-level mechanisms through which election violence reinforces certain political orders while undermining others. 

"Beyond state capacity: The electoral logics of land formalization in Kenya," with Mai Hassan.

 

When and why do elites choose to formalize land rights? Many existing studies assume that formal tenure rights accompany the distribution of land or property. Yet there are many cases where the state distributes land but fails to provide formal tenure rights, creating a “property rights gap” (Albertus 2017). Existing research suggests that under authoritarian regimes—where elites have few institutional constraints, or where the state lacks the institutional capacity to formalize rights—a property rights gap emerges or endures. Yet regime type and state capacity alone do not account for the significant variation we observe in land rights formalization at the sub-national level. In contrast to cross-national analyses, we use micro-level data on land allocation and formalization in Kenya to examine why state elites close the property rights gap in some agrarian localities but not others. We find that elites under a democratic regime are not more likely to formalize rights. Rather, the logic of land formalization changes. Whereas leaders under authoritarian regimes are likely to prioritize co-ethnics, we find that in the context of multi-party elections, elites prioritize non-co-ethnics or perceived swing voters.

Altruistic Hosts? Refugee Settlement and the Politics of Land in Uganda

 

Sub-Saharan Africa currently hosts more than 26 percent of the world’s 70 million refugees (UNHCR 2019). Existing studies provide important insight into the destabilizing effects of refugee populations, identifying macro and highly-local factors affecting host-migrant dynamics. Yet we know less about how refugee settlement policies alter host-migrant relationships. Uganda’s model of refugee settlement provides a unique but important case. The government promotes a policy of “self-reliance” by providing refugees with a plot of land for housing and cultivation. This policy, however, relies on the willingness of host communities to lease customary land to refugees. This raises a key question for the study of host-migrant relations: Why are some host communities willing to host and grant land to refugees, while others are not? What factors strengthen or erode this seemingly altruistic gesture? Exploiting micro-level variation across four refugee-hosting communities, the paper combines in-depth interviews and survey data to evaluate four possible motivations for granting land: material (access to development), altruistic (goods hosts), empathetic (shared experience of displacement) and political recognition. Broadly, the paper demonstrates that the way international agencies and host governments acquire and designate land for settlement powerfully affects host-migrant relations, helping to explain where hosts will seek to incorporate or exclude refugees. 

Demanding Recognition: Citizen Demands for Clientelism in Sub-Saharan Africa

(With Jeffrey Paller and Martha Wilfahrt)

 

Why do citizens engage in political clientelism, and how do they understand their role in patronage exchanges? Existing scholarship provides two explanations. Material explanations suggest that citizens respond to environments of scarcity, and use clientelism as a way to secure livelihoods. Culturalist explanations suggest that citizens demand goods from leaders due to a social norm of reciprocity. While both explanations find empirical support in sub-Saharan Africa, they overlook a key component of political clientelism: the demand for social recognition. Social recognition is the acknowledgement of citizen claims for respect and dignity as human beings, which requires equality as members of the polity. Drawing from three diverse African contexts – urban Ghana, rural Senegal, and coastal Kenya – we suggest that political clientelism provides an avenue of social recognition, or the acknowledgement of one’s identity and dignity as a human being. The paper builds on ethnography, interviews and focus groups conducted over many years of field research, to focus on the way that citizens make meaning of their relationships with politicians. The paper provides new insights into the logics of political clientelism, citizen strategies and practices amidst unequal power relationships, and the role of emotions in democratic politics.

Writing samples are available upon request.  Please e-mail me: kfklaus@usfca.edu